Paternalism is the restriction of individual liberty for a person's own good and coercive paternalism occurs when threats of harm are used to bring about such restriction. Laws that prevent people from engaging in certain occupations, that outlaw religions, and that prohibit activities, insofar as they are intended for the good of those whose freedom is restricted, are examples of coercive paternalism. Raz claims there are two conditions needed to justify coercive paternalism: first, it is undertaken for a good reason, one sufficient to make reasonable a partial loss of independence. Secondly, barring emergencies, it comes from the hands of someone reasonably trusted by the coerced. (LT 122, footnote omitted.) I will refer to the second as "the trust condition." Raz intends it as a necessary condition for justified coercive paternalism. He writes that " [o] nly those trusted by the coerced can have authority to use paternalistic coercion" (LT 123) and that " [t] rust in the government is a condition of its right to apply coercion to people for their own good, a condition for the legitimacy of paternalistic coercion." (LT 126-7) The next step of the argument is a catch-22. The very fact that government is acting paternalistically toward you means that you should not trust it:
If [government] pursues coercive moral paternalism against me it will, by definition, be preventing me from following my way of life (. . . .) It undercuts my trust that I and my interests are seriously being taken into account in deciding public action. (. . .) [G] overnments cannot resort to moral paternalism for by doing so they undercut their right to do so because they lose the trust of those against whom the coercion is used. (LT 127-8, emphasis omitted) Raz says that coercive "moral" paternalism occurs when a person is prevented from following his/her way of life, for example laws and policies intended to discourage homosexuality. What then would count as coercive "non-moral" paternalism? The idea here is to draw a distinction between coercive paternalism that imposes values on a person who does not accept them (moral paternalism), and coercive paternalism that forces people to do things that they themselves would recognize as good (non-moral paternalism). An example of the second could be laws forcing people to wear seatbelts in cars. Most (though not all) people recognize the good of not being thrown through car windscreens, so forcing them to wear seatbelts is coercive non-moral paternalism. Raz's argument is not aimed at this type of paternalism. (Henceforth, I will refer to coercive moral paternalism as "CMP".) Raz does not explicitly define "trust". I take it as implying two main beliefs: a belief in the good intentions and a belief in the ability of the trustee. Belief in the ability but not good intentions is reliance not trust 8 : If I believe that a bus driver is competent at getting me to my destination on time but
does not have my welfare at heart, then I may be said to rely upon instead of to trust the driver. On the other hand, if I believe a person has good intentions toward me but lacks the ability to carry them through, then again I do not trust that person. That Raz has something like this definition of "trust" in mind is shown in several of his remarks. As we will see, a central part of his argument is that targets of moral paternalism will always lack a belief in the good intentions of the paternalist and therefore lack trust.
The trust condition is intended to be of independent moral force as an argument against paternalism.
That is, it is intended to render unjustified, paternalism that might otherwise be justified. Recall the first of Raz's two conditions for justified coercive paternalism: that it be done for good reason. The trust condition is intended to add to instead of merely reflect this. As Raz notes:
Even where the cogency of the paternalistic reasons for coercion is not in doubt one may well object if a stranger, let alone a potentially hostile stranger, takes it upon himself to coerce one for one's own good. The point reflects the nature of trust (. . . .) (LT 122) However, the trust condition requires that the paternalist must be reasonably trusted by the coerced according to Raz. The adjective makes the condition semi-objective instead of purely subjective. This says Raz means that it "turns not simply on how people actually feel but how it is reasonable for them to feel." (LT 124) So in some cases trust exists but it is not reasonable:
Some people are deluded into believing that the government takes their interests fully into consideration [and consequently trust the government], when in fact the government and the law are systematically biased against them. (LT 124) Trust in such a case does no justificatory work since it is not reasonable trust. Conversely, there could be cases where no actual trust exists but this lack is unreasonable. (LT 124) This raises the question whether intervention in such cases would be justified, since the lack of trust is unreasonable. Raz suggests that it would not be, and I will assume the same in the remainder of the essay. Trust must be present for intervention to be justified, but it must reasonable trust.
The reasonableness requirement risks robbing the trust argument of independent force. Consider a case of paternalism the targets of which trust the paternalist. If the trust condition required mere trust, whether reasonable or unreasonable, the presence of trust in this case would make the intervention justified (so long as other required conditions are met). However, with the requirement being "reasonable" trust, we have to ask whether the trust is reasonable, and if it is not, intervention is unjustified. But there is a temptation to interpret the reasonableness of the trust or lack thereof as turning entirely on whether there are good reasons for the intervention. Raz is careful to ward off this implication. Requiring trust to be reasonable only makes the trust condition semi-objective. As Raz says, the condition has a subjective component. It turns not on how governments actually treat people but on what they feel about their treatment, so long as their feeling is not unreasonable. This subjective element gives [it] an independent status as a constraint on governmental actions. Had the condition (. . .) been simply that one is treated by the government as one ought to be treated it would have had no independent role in guiding governmental action. (. . .) However, given that the condition is partly subjective it has an independent normative force: governments should not only act justly, they should also be seen to act so, at least by all those whose beliefs on the matter are not unreasonable. In short, the requirement of reasonable trust attempts to veer between two extremes. If it was purely subjective it would simply be a matter of consulting people and asking them whether they trust a paternalistic government, but this would allow cases where people are deluded into trusting. If it was purely objective it would be a matter of whether the paternalism is supported by good reasons, and the trust requirement would be doing no work. It is important to keep this in mind, especially in section 4
when we examine whether it is reasonable to trust a paternalistic government. Any affirmative argument for this must not simply refer to the good reasons that might support the paternalism and thus render the trust requirement redundant.
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The trust argument can be formally summarized in the following way:
P1: Coercive paternalism is justified only if the paternalist is reasonably trusted by the coerced.
P2: A person subjected to CMP cannot reasonably trust the government.
Therefore, C: CMP is not justified.
The conclusion follows validly from the two premises so I turn to examination of those premises, starting with P1.
Justifying the Trust Condition
Why is trust required for legitimate intervention? Why is it not sufficient that action just be good intervention, regardless of whether it is trusted? Imagine that I am correct in thinking that you are mistaken, that the mistake will significantly undermine your well-being, and that I am in a position to prevent you from harming yourself. On the trust argument, even if there are good grounds for paternalism, a lack of (reasonable) trust means intervention would be unjustified. Trust might make it more likely that intervention would succeed, instead of backfiring by creating resistance and resentment to the intervention. These are reasons to think that trust is useful, but hardly reasons to make trust always necessary before intervention is legitimate. In some cases intervention without trust could succeed. Why should I need your trust before I intervene?
A. Coercion and Whole-heartedness Raz's defense of the premise is that it is an implication of what is wrong with coercion generally.
Coercion is the use of threats to force a person to act or refrain from acting some way. 10 Legal constraints are usually coercive since they usually threaten some form of punishment if not complied with. Coercion is presumptively wrong for several reasons. One is that it may interfere with autonomy (though Raz says that coercion may also sometimes promote autonomy by providing opportunities and access to them (LT 120)). But as I suggested in section one, we are putting autonomy to one sideRaz intends the trust argument to be an independent argument against paternalism. Another reason that coercion is wrong, Raz argues, is due its effect on personal well-being. Well-being, according to Raz, consists in the whole-hearted and successful engagement in valuable activities and relationships. There are several points at which this argument can be questioned. First is the claim that coercion undermines the whole-hearted pursuit of goals, and thereby well-being. Is it not possible to wholeheartedly pursue something I have been coerced into, even if I do not trust the good intentions of the coercer? Someone might be kidnapped and press-ganged into a ship's crew by unscrupulous merchantseamen, but still come to find value in a life on the oceans. The denial of such possibilities is an empirical claim, but Raz appears to hold that it is a necessary truth. However, even if we accept it as a necessary truth or a strong contingent one (in the sense that it almost always holds) this still does not mean that the trust condition should be accepted. Either of those would show that paternalistic coercion without trust undermines well-being. Even if so, it is possible that the reduction in well-being brought about by coercion without trust could be outweighed by the benefit to well-being that the paternalist could bring about. Coercive paternalism without trust may undermine the whole-heartedness aspect of well-being, but perhaps that loss can be outweighed by a gain in well-being if the person chooses something more valuable instead and engages in it with some lesser degree of whole-heartedness.
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Maybe the choices are only these two: government forcing people into art galleries or those people never discovering galleries for themselves and hence never experiencing great art. In this case, it is possible that the loss in well-being due to less whole-heartedness could be outweighed by the gain in well-being due to engaging in more valuable activities. For Raz's premise to be true, it must be the case that the reduction in well-being brought about by coercion without trust always outweighs any other possible gain in well-being that might be brought about by intervention. And that is implausible.
B. A Positive Attitude Argument
To rescue the argument we need some other reasons for thinking that trust is a necessary condition for justified paternalism. Some of Raz's comments suggest such an alternative argument for P1. Raz criticizes the common thought that government is legitimate only if it has the consent of those governed. He argues that "the ideal of universal consent, however attenuated, is unrealizable." (LT 121) But he does suggest that consent has normative significance and that this significance is related to the notion of trust. After setting out his trust condition he claims that it "explains the way consent can be relevant to the justification of coercion. It can express or establish a relationship of trust." (LT 122)
Ulysses' temporary loss of autonomy when he is tied to the mast of his ship so as not to succumb to the lure of the Sirens, says Raz, was justified. He consented to it, but "had he been tied to the mast by his best friend" (LT 121) without consent, it would also have been a justified act due to the relationship of trust. So consent can justify paternalism because it expresses or establishes trust. This is not an argument for the trust condition because it presupposes that condition and then claims that consent is a way of showing trust. But perhaps a different way of conceiving the relation between consent and trust is possible.
The view that consent is necessary for legitimate paternalism is an attractive one that has its defenders.
13 But it faces the objection that there are some cases, such as intervention with a person about to unknowingly cross a dangerous bridge, where paternalism without consent appears justified.
To avoid this difficulty defenders of the consent view sometimes appeal to hypothetical consent; the would-be bridge crosser would, it is argued, consent to intervention if he were not ignorant about the dangerous bridge. But hypothetical consent arguments also face objections. Perhaps instead, some other notion such as trust can capture the desirable features of the consent account, while avoiding its problems. Consent and trust are both expressions of positive attitudes. Other such attitudes could be agreement, gratitude, approval, and endorsement. The argument I am suggesting is this: if a positive attitude from the subject of paternalism is a necessary condition for justified paternalism then it is trust, not consent, that is the appropriate positive attitude. This bare sketch of an argument needs to be filled out in several areas. Even if a positive attitude of some sort is necessary perhaps it is consent, not trust, since although I mentioned above that consent accounts face difficulties, perhaps there are responses to these. And even if a positive attitude is necessary and it is not consent, perhaps it is not trust either but something else such as gratitude or endorsement.
14 Even if answers to these questions are forthcoming, something needs to be said about why any positive attitude is needed. As I asked at the beginning of section 2, if I can prevent you from making a mistaken decision that will significantly undermine your well-being, why should I need a positive attitude from you before I go ahead? Perhaps requiring such an attitude is a deontological requirement for respecting persons. But what is it about persons that respecting them requires a positive attitude on their part before it is justified to treat them in particular ways? When we focus on consent, the usual answer given is that consent is required for justified paternalism in order to respect a person's capacity for autonomy. 15 But as was pointed out in section 1, we are seeking a rationale against paternalism that is independent of appeals to autonomy, so we cannot ground the positive attitude in autonomy. Some attempts have been made to ground consent on considerations other than respecting autonomy, but whether these grounds could also support the trust requirement is unclear. So we still lack independent grounds for the trust condition. The argument being considered tries to turn the appeal of consent in favor of the trust condition, but in doing so leaves unanswered the question of the grounds for requiring a trust relationship in order to justify paternalism. Until we have some autonomy-independent grounds for the requirement of consent and can show that these grounds also or instead support the trust condition, then the argument is unsatisfactorily incomplete.
C. A Lockean Argument
The concept of trust plays an explicit role in the political philosophy of John Locke. According to Locke, government is legitimate when and only when individuals in the state of nature enter a twostage social contract. In the first stage, people agree to unite themselves, forming a civil society in order to avoid the inconveniences of the state of nature. In the second stage this society entrusts political power to a government. If government exceeds the limits of its rightful power, it has betrayed the trust given it by the people, is therefore illegitimate, and rightful power returns to society, which may remove that government and set up another in its place. 16 On this argument, trust is a necessary condition for legitimate government and therefore a necessary condition for legitimate government paternalism. While this is narrower than P1, which requires trust for all coercive paternalism whether from government or others
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, it provides a premise that would result in a conclusion that would rule out CMP by government, which is Raz's main concern.
However, the centrality of the notion of trust in this argument is illusory. According to Locke, the legitimate power that government is entrusted with is defined by the protection of the natural rights to life, liberty, and property that individuals have in the state of nature. It is due to the uncertain protection of these rights that people agree to form civil society and it is for the protection of these rights that people agree to form civil society and entrust their protection to government. Trust itself is doing no work in the argument; legitimacy of government turns more fundamentally on whether it is protecting and enforcing peoples natural rights.
It might be thought that this is not a significant difficulty because even understood in this way, But three weaker claims about the importance of voluntary compliance and trust in government could be made, which although weaker, may be sufficient to rescue P1 of the trust argument:
(1) Citizens must not have extreme distrust of government if it is to be effective.
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(2) Trust is an important good for effective government.
21
(3) Trust is necessary in some areas of government action.
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Hardin does not elaborate, but the thought behind the first claim would appear to be that while it is possible to govern effectively using coercion instead of voluntariness, if the lack of trust is extreme,
there will be such disobedience that even coercive government will not function. The second claim concedes that trust is not necessary for effective government but maintains that it is highly important -government that enjoys voluntary compliance is able to implement its decisions more easily and can use its scarce resources that would otherwise be spent on securing compliance, for other purposes. show (1) that for paternalism to succeed it must not be accompanied by extreme distrust of the paternalistic government, (2) that trust would be an important good for paternalistic government, and (3) that trust may be necessary if paternalism involves areas of government action that require voluntary compliance. Taken together these claims do not add up to the blanket prohibition against CMP-without-trust that P1 of the trust argument would establish. That condition forbids a government from proceeding with CMP without trust, but on these three conditions it may proceed so long as (1) the lack of trust is not extreme distrust, (2) the gain in welfare to the target of paternalism is enough to outweigh the opportunity cost of whatever else government could do with the resources it has to use to enforce the paternalism, and (3) the paternalistic action does not regard an action that requires voluntary compliance.
Given the difficulties government faces if it is to make fine-grained policies, these three claims may provide sufficient reason for it to adopt the more general rule against CMP that P1 sets. Governments are fallible and if they try to engage in CMP while respecting each of the three claims above, they will sometimes be paternalistic when paternalism is unsuccessful -that is, when intervention leaves the targets worse off -and will sometimes not be paternalistic when paternalism would have been successful -that is, would have benefited the targets. How to weigh up these gains and costs is a difficult matter. 24 The thought that government could coerce people for their own good but end up making them worse off is indeed a scary one, but people leading bad lives when they could lead better are also consequences that must be taken into account. If the costs of unsuccessful paternalism would outweigh the gains of successful paternalism then government would have a rule-consequentialist rationale for the trust condition P1. However, if on the other hand government is extremely competent it will be able to engage in CMP while respecting the three claims above. It would not have to abide by the trust condition.
As we will see in the next section, the competence of government will affect not only whether it ought to be bound by the trust condition but also how reasonable it is to trust it when it engages in CMP. For the moment I conclude that some reason exists to accept P1 of the trust argument though for different reasons than Raz suggests. Because of the three claims above, government might sometimes accept P1 when this would have better consequences than having a more fine-grained policy of trying to work around the three claims. This conclusion is qualified because there may be circumstances in which government could do a better job by working around the three claims instead of accepting P1. So P1
can be taken as true only in particular conditions instead of generally so.
Is it Reasonable to Trust Paternalistic Government?
I turn to the second premise: a person subjected to CMP cannot reasonably trust the government. Why is this true? Imagine that government is genuinely concerned with my interests and pursues what it takes to be well-justified paternalistic policies and that I know this. Trust in this case would appear to be reasonable. However, according to Raz, even in such circumstances, such trust would be unreasonable. The argument, in short, is that by preventing me from following my way of life, the state denies the validity of my fundamental beliefs concerning how to live my life, which thereby makes it impossible for me to think that the government is seriously taking my interests into account when making decisions, and that this is sufficient to make trust unreasonable.
To elaborate, Raz claims that before a person may reasonably trust the government, she must enjoy full citizenship. Enjoying full citizenship means she feels (and is not unreasonable to so feel) that the government recognizes her as a person who matters in her own right, that her fate is a matter of intrinsic value in the eyes of the state (LT 124). She reasonably believes that her interests are given due consideration by the government when it makes its decisions. The condition of citizenship contains a subjective element. It depends not only on how the government treats a person but also on how she feels she is being treated, so long as that feeling is not unreasonable. According to Raz, citizenship is a precondition of trust. He writes that "[t]hose who find it impossible to regard the government as their government, and to regard themselves as full citizens alongside everyone else, are unable to trust the government." (LT 127) Next, Raz claims that most paternalism undermines the existence of full citizenship. He says that if the government pursues coercive moral paternalism against me it will, by definition, be preventing me from following my way of life, and it denies, in a purported exercise of its authority, the validity of propositions I hold true and which underpin my way of life. If it does so, however, it denies me full citizenship. (LT 127, emphasis omitted.)
In doing so it "undercuts my trust that I and my interests are seriously being taken into account in deciding public action." (LT 127) Someone whose fundamental values and beliefs are rejected as worthless by the government will not trust the government as acting in her interests. Of course, CMP may be motivated by concern for the well-being of the subjects of the coercion. The government may actually view them as of intrinsic worth in their own right. But the crucial question, on Raz's argument, is whether the subjects of paternalism will see it this way, and would not be unreasonable to do so. Raz argues that the subjects would not feel the same way as the paternalist. He argues that even if the government is acting out of the best intentions, it is bound to seem to them as failing through moral blindness to take them and their wellbeing seriously, lacking the ability to give their interests the weight they deserve. The people who feel like that may be wrong. Their beliefs and way of life may indeed be worthless. But it is reasonable for them to deny that and to feel that the government has forfeited their trust.
(LT 127)
So we have two steps of the argument for P2:
X. Government is reasonably trusted by a person only if she reasonably feels that the government recognizes her as someone who matters intrinsically.
Y. A person cannot reasonably feel that the government recognizes her as someone who matters intrinsically if it coercively prevents her from following her way of life, which is what CMP does (by definition).
Raz's argument for X is that a person may reasonably trust government only if she has full citizenship and that a person has full citizenship only if she reasonably feels that the government recognizes her as someone whose interests matter intrinsically. I have no quarrel with these claims, although we might question whether this is an accurate account of the meaning of citizenship. Be that as it may, we should accept X as true. It is implausible that we could reasonably trust someone that we believe does not take our interests as mattering in their own right. Some belief in good intentions is a necessary condition for
But what about Y? It is true that CMP denies the validity of the propositions that underpin my way of life, and may condemn these fundamental beliefs as base and worthless. Paternalism is motivated by the belief that the target's views are mistaken. But is this a sufficient reason to think the government does not take my interests seriously? It appears plausible to think so, but I will argue that it is not.
Crucial to my argument is a distinction between content-dependent and content-independent reasons for trusting or not trusting. The first refers to whether or not the subject of paternalism agrees with rationale for the paternalism, whereas content-independent reasons make the reasonableness of trust depend on factors other than the substantive content of the decision. An underlying assumption of claim Y is that reasonable trust turns only upon or strongly upon content-dependent reasons. Raz's argument is that it is unreasonable to trust government when a person disagrees with the content of a decision it makes, especially where the disagreement is over something as fundamental as one's way of life. It assumes this to be so even though there may be strong content-independent reasons for trusting.
To challenge this assumption I will outline several areas of content-independent reasons for trusting by drawing on some of the literature on trust and government. These reasons appeal to procedural fairness, competence, trust-responsiveness, and encapsulated interest. My claim is that when there are sufficient content-independent reasons for trusting, anyone who trusts a government engaging in CMP is showing reasonable trust, even though government is denying his/her fundamental beliefs.
A. Procedural Fairness
Imagine I know that the government has met the following conditions:
• Participation: citizens have opportunity to have input into the policy via submissions to government committees, committee meetings being open to the public, etc.
• Considered judgment: the government has thought long and deeply about the issue when arriving at its decision, considering all the arguments or all that are available on either side of the issue.
• Publicity: government takes adequate steps to explain the rationale behind the paternalism, to explain how it thinks people are mistaken.
• Consistency: the paternalistic policy is applied to all those who meet the relevant criteria, not arbitrarily applied to a select few.
If I know that these conditions are met, then I would have reason to believe that the government is seriously taking my interests into account in its decision-making. These conditions of procedural fairness are content-independent reasons for trusting in that their being met is compatible with a wide range of substantive outcomes. Claim Y assumes that even if these conditions are satisfied, any trust that someone has toward a government that is engaging in CMP is unreasonable trust. But people could, I suggest, reasonably trust a government that makes decisions they disagree with so long as those decisions are made according to legitimate processes. Government having fair procedures signals that it takes peoples interests seriously. Empirical evidence shows that citizens do trust government when they believe procedures are fair even though the outcomes are unfavorable to them. 25 A survey of why U.S. citizens trusted or distrusted government showed that substantive policies were of little importance. More significant were the caliber of personnel, accountability, transparency, honesty, and lack of corruption. 26 Raz could of course deny that this empirical evidence has any bearing on whether trust is reasonable. However, once the conditions are spelt out it is intuitively plausible that it is reasonable to trust under such circumstances.
B. Competence
Imagine that government also meets the following conditions:
• Success: government succeeds in forcing me into the way of life it believes is valuable.
• Localized intervention: it does its utmost to ensure that the coercion is as localized as possible so that it does not interfere with my other options.
• Significance: the mistake is of such magnitude that my life will be significantly worse.
• No alternatives: no less intrusive measures would achieve the same outcome.
• Trust transference: if government acts competently in non-paternalistic spheres, such as in its protection of property rights and provision of public goods, the trust it builds in those spheres makes it more reasonable to trust government in its paternalistic sphere.
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Once these conditions are met, something more than good intentions has been demonstrated. The government has also demonstrated willingness and an ability to put its good intentions into action. This willingness and ability make it reasonable for me to think the government believes my interests count, even if I am right and it is wrong about what is in my interests. When these conditions are met, someone subject to CMP could reasonably trust government.
C. Trust-Responsiveness
A further consideration lies in the self-fulfilling nature of trust. It is more reasonable to trust government if it is trust-responsive. Trust-responsiveness occurs when the person trusted takes the trust shown him/her to be an additional motivation for being trustworthy. 28 To illustrate, say that someone I know has reasons for behaving toward me in a particular way. If I trust that person to so behave, then if she is trust-responsive, she will take that trust to be another reason, above and beyond the reasons she already has, to behave in that way. And that fact -the fact that she is trust-responsive -gives me an additional reason to trust her. If citizens know that in addition to the reasons government has for acting the way it does, government will take the trust shown it to be an additional reason, then they are more likely to trust government. Here is how Pettit puts it:
The appearance of personal trust among the citizens, then, can actually increase the grounds that people have for feeling trust [if government is trust-responsive]. For when citizens trust government agents to do that which the citizens apparently only have reasons of trustworthiness to expect, then in reality there are also other reasons for expecting those agents to comply.
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If government is trust-responsive in this way, then it is more reasonable for citizens to trust it, even if it is engaging in CMP. Pettit argues that its desire for good opinion will provide government with sufficient reason to be and appear to be trust-responsive. Perhaps, but there may be other reasons. In particular in the present context, government will have reason to be trust-responsive because -given the trust condition -it knows that for its paternalism to be justified it must have the trust of people. If government wants to advance the welfare of its citizens through paternalistic policies, but it is bound by the trust condition that says that paternalism must be accompanied by trust, then government will want to do all it can to ensure that it is trusted. And one thing it can do is take a position of trustresponsiveness. Doing so will make it more likely that it is trusted, and thereby improve the chances of being able to engage in justified CMP. Here again is another content-independent reason for trusting paternalistic government. So long government is trust-responsive in this way, which it has strong motivation to be if it wants to engage in legitimate CMP, then people have reason to trust it even if it is acting paternalistically.
D. Encapsulated Interest
Trust is more reasonable if it is in the trustee's interest to do what is in the trustor's interest. 30 It is more reasonable to trust a government engaging in CMP if you know it is in the government's interest to act in your interests. The typical way in which citizens' interests are encapsulated with government's interests is via democratic elections. Elections make it more likely that government will act in people's interests because if it does not, it will be elected out of office. An obvious difficulty in using this mechanism of encapsulating interests to make paternalistic government more trustworthy is that it will only work if citizens know and vote according to their best interests, but the types of policies we are discussing -paternalistic ones -are precisely those in which people do not know their best interests.
Elections will provide government with an incentive to refrain from paternalism when it may make them unpopular even though that paternalism would be good for people. One way around this difficulty is to seek a mechanism other than elections, some institutional arrangement that will provide a selfinterested incentive for government to make sure its paternalistic policies are trustworthy. For example, an independent branch of government such as the judiciary could be given the task of examining CMP to ensure it is justified. Courts in many countries already have the power to overturn government policies and legislation, and governments have interests in avoiding decisions that may be overturned. A way forward, I suggest, is to think of the issue as involving two sliding scales. The first scale is that of the CIRTs. The reasonableness of trusting government increases the more that the CIRTs are satisfied, and decreases the less they are met. This assumes that the degree to which the CIRTs are met can be measured. Each of the criteria in the CIRTs can be met to a greater or lesser extent: each of the fair procedures can be less-than-fully satisfied; the competence of government admits of degrees; and similarly for how much trust-responsiveness and encapsulated interest exists. With suitable weightings, these factors can be combined to give an overall measure of how far the CIRTs are met.
The second scale measures the extent of CMP. The claim that it is reasonable not to trust CMP is also, I
suggest, a matter of degree. Taking the example of homosexuality that Raz uses, imagine a society in which such conduct is criminalized, homosexuals are discriminated against, and portrayals of homosexuality in the media are forbidden (LT 126 Putting these considerations together, we reach a conclusion about the reasonableness of trusting CMP.
Assume we can measure how far the CIRTs are met on a scale with high numbers for a high degree of satisfaction (fair procedures, competent government, etc) and low numbers for a low degree (unfair procedures, incompetent government, etc). Of course some way of measuring these criteria and combining them to give an overall score is needed. But without working that out here, I will assume that some way exists. Call the resulting scale the CIRT index. Assume we can also combine the two dimensions of CMP outlined above -how fundamental are the beliefs denied and how strongly they are denied -and also measure them on a scale whereby the high numbers mean the beliefs denied are fundamental and/or strongly denied and the low numbers mean the reverse. Call this the CMP index.
The two scales, CIRTs and CMP, together determine the reasonableness of trusting paternalistic government. Strong forms of CMP can be reasonably trusted, and therefore justified, only if they are accompanied by the CIRTs being met to a sufficiently high degree. The less the CIRTs are met, the less reasonable trust will be and the less justified CMP is. For any given level of CMP it is reasonable to trust government only if there are adequate CIRTs. Figure 1 represents these ideas graphically.
Line X is similar to indifference curves used in economics. At each point on the line it is equally reasonable to trust government engaged in CMP. With relatively mild forms of CMP, it is reasonable to trust government if and only if it achieves a relatively low score on the CIRT index (point A). With stronger forms of CMP, it is as reasonable to trust if and only if government meets the CIRTs to an even higher degree (point B). As government's CMP gets stronger the CIRTs must rise in order to maintain the same reasonableness of trusting it. Other lines of reasonableness could be drawn parallel to Line X. Lines above and to the left would represent more reasonable trust -for a given CMP, the CIRTs would be greater than with line X. Lines below and to the right of Line X would represent less reasonable trust, since CMP would be stronger for a given level of CIRTs. I will assume that Line X is the level of reasonableness just sufficient to justify CMP. 
Conclusion
Recall the original argument:
P1. Coercive paternalism is justified only if the paternalist is reasonably trusted by the coerced.
P2. A person subjected to CMP cannot reasonably trust the government.
Therefore, C. CMP is not justified.
I have questioned both P1 and P2. Raz's argument for P1 is weak, and I examined other arguments for it. The most promising was the functional argument that emphasizes the importance of trust for effective government. This argument supports P1 but only if government lacks competence and only if the consequences of unsuccessful paternalism would be sufficiently bad. Without these assumptions the argument at best supports three ways in which government should be cautious in engaging in paternalism (see section 2 D).
P2 was also questioned. If my arguments are correct then we must conclude that the reasonableness of trusting government engaged in CMP is not as straightforward as P2 suggests. It may or may not be reasonable to trust government engaged in CMP, depending on how strong that CMP is and how wellarranged the political institutions are that provide CIRTs. So the trust argument could be restated thus, replacing P2 with P2*:
P1. Coercive paternalism is justified only if the paternalist is reasonably trusted by the coerced. P2*. It is reasonable to trust government engaged in CMP if and only if that CMP is in proportion to the content-independent reasons for trusting government.
Therefore, C. CMP may or may not be justified, depending on the correlation between a government's CMP and its CIRTs. This is not an exciting conclusion I admit, but sometimes the truth is not exciting. However, perhaps a less vague conclusion can be drawn. For the stronger forms of CMP to be justified they must be accompanied by political arrangements that rate highly on the CIRT index. But high levels of CIRTs are far removed from reality. Most governments do not achieve procedural fairness, competence, trustresponsiveness, and encapsulated interest to a high degree. No government meets them perfectly and most would score lowly. It is quite plausible to withhold trust from government that wants to engage in stronger forms of CMP if the CIRTs are not met. Since the CIRTs do not hold highly in the real world then stronger forms of CMP cannot be reasonably trusted. This gives us support for a different version of P2, P2**: that we should not trust government if it engages in strong CMP (at least until the CIRTs are better met).
So we can restate the argument again, this time with P2** for P2 and P2*:
P2.** A person subjected to strong CMP cannot reasonably trust the government (at least in real world conditions).
Therefore, C. Strong CMP is not justified (at least in real world conditions).
While in principle coercive moral paternalism could be justified if government meets particular conditions to a high degree, until that time strong forms of such paternalism are not justified. 
NOTES

